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DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW AND BUSINESS
VALUATION IN A NINETEENTH CENTURY MERGER:
A NOTE
Abstract: In 1889 the Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal Company Limited was incorporated to take over the assets and business activities of two existing companies. To
guide the contracting parties in negotiating a price to be paid for the properties
belonging to the Shelton Collieries and Ironworks an independent valuation was
arranged by Deloitte, Dever, Griffiths & Co., later appointed auditors of the new
company. The article comprises an appraisal of the valuation exercise, which is
an early example of the use of a discounted cash flow technique to provide relevant information for a capital investment decision.

Discounted cash flow (DCF) criteria have been applied to insurance matters and financial investments for several centuries, but
it is only during the present century that they have gained widespread theoretical acceptance for capital investment purposes.
Capital value theory was developed by economists such as Irving
Fisher and Alfred Marshall in the 1920s, leading to formal expositions of the net present value (NPV) rule and the internal rate of
return (IRR) model by P. A. Samuelson and K. Boulding respectively in the 1930s.1 However, employment of these techniques as part
of the decision-making process within United Kingdom companies
is not as widespread as might be expected and is sometimes supposed to be the case. G. D. Newbould's study of takeover and
merger activity in the late 1960s2 showed that none of the companies included in his survey had made use of DCF techniques to
value an enterprise, either as a means of assessing the viability of
a prospective investment or as a means of retaliating against a
low bid. The most popular methods of valuation, identified by
Newbould, were book or market values of assets and current market
prices of securities. Comparison of price earnings ratios was also
favoured as a means of assessing a prospective investment. Judged
theoretically, each of these methods is considered to be sub-optimal.
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Book and market values of assets bear no necessary relationship
to future earnings capacity, the market price of a security reflects
only the value of a minority interest, whilst the price earnings ratio
is based on past earnings.
Why have these inherent errors of principle not deterred companies from using sub-optimal valuation methods in preference to
the theoretically pre-eminent DCF techniques? The reasons have not
changed since they were first identified by Bonbright in the 1930s.3
Forecasting future cash flows and selecting a suitable discount rate
are subjective exercises difficult to defend in law. Forecasting future
cash flows inevitably involves a strong element of crystal-ball
gazing and, instead of a series of known returns, estimates used
will be, at best, a range of possible outcomes dependent upon the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of Various future events. Moreover
the discount rate which, in theory, should represent the risk-free
rate of interest plus a premium for risk, both unknowns, must, in
practice, also be estimated. The effect of these practical difficulties
is that DCF techniques have come to be regarded, by many businessmen, as academic ideals with little relevance to the imperfect
market in which firms operate. It is therefore interesting to discover
that as early as 1889, well before the techniques had achieved even
widespread academic recognition, use was being made of DCF
valuation procedures in an uncontested merger.
An Early Application of the DCF method
Two enterprises, Lord Granville's Shelton Collieries and Ironworks (SCI) and the Shelton Iron and Steel Company Limited (SIS),
agreed to join together to form the Shelton Iron, Steel and Coal
Company Limited (SISC).4 To guide the contracting parties in
negotiating the price to be paid for SCI, Messrs. Deloitte, Dever,
Griffiths & Co., later appointed auditors of SISC, arranged for
William Craig of Cheshire5 to value the property belonging to the
former company. The detailed terms of reference given to Craig
are repeated in his report dated 16 July 1889 and include the requirements to advise on "the condition of the . . . [properties] . . .
and on their present value." 6
Model Employed. The basic model used by Craig for the purpose
of computing the DCF value is, in essence, identical with the theoretical model recommended today. Craig forecasts future cash
flows based on recent past results and his assessment of the various
factors which might be expected to alter these results in the future
and, second, estimates a suitable discount rate which, when applied
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to the cash flows, produces a figure for present value.a A preliminary criticism which might be directed at Craig's report is that it
does not incorporate a calculation of the break up value of the
business, i.e., the lowest price that the vendor should be willing to
accept for the sale of the enterprise as a going concern. Nor does
he estimate the maximum price the rational purchaser will pay,
namely the replacement cost of an enterprise possessing a similar
earning capacity. However, these matters were not explicitly included in the terms of reference given to Craig. The owners of
the merging concerns were, of course, maintaining their proprietorial links as shareholders of the new concern.7 This suggests
that a policy decision had been made to continue investing in the
manufacture of iron and steel and, except in the unusual circumstance of the break up value exceeding replacement cost, the
calculation of these upper and lower limits would have served no
useful purpose.
The practical difficulties encountered by Craig when attempting
to apply the theoretical model to a real business situation were no
different from those facing investment appraisers today. It is therefore interesting to consider how he tackled the problem, the extent
to which his figures were relied upon for price-fixing purposes, and
the degree of success achieved by a comparison with subsequent
events. These matters are examined below.
Methodology
The early part of the report lists and describes the various leases,
pits and blast furnaces which comprised the undertaking.8 The
effect of using this approach is to divide the entire enterprise into
a number of separate and distinct parts as the basis for the valuation exercise, the results of which are summarised in Table I.
Cash Flows: Collieries. For each of the pits the present rate of
working and the reserves yet unworked are identified.9 In accordance with his terms of reference, Craig next assesses the financial
implications of opening up several new workings on the leasehold
properties. 10 Inclusion of the expected financial effects of development proposals for the collieries is explained in two ways. First,
the enterprise was obliged under the terms of its two-leases to sink
an extra three pits within certain time limits and, second, since
a
Craig's exercise would seem to compare favourably with another early (1915)
attempt at investment appraisal for which some sophistication is claimed by George
A. Wing, in his article "Capital Budgeting, Circa. 1915," but which uses only simple interest tables to compute present values.
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Table 1
Present value of SCI per Craig's Report dated 16 July 1889
Years

COLLIERIES
Duchy Lease,
30 years:
Present Workings
Additional Revenue
from Opening
New Pits, Commencing Year 8
Cost of

Cash
Flow

Discount
Rate

£

%

1-30

14,646p.a.

15

8-30

14,854p.a.

15

3,751 p.a.

Development

1-7

End Value of Plant

30

50,000

8-40

30,000p.a.

Sneyd Lease,
40 years:
Revenue from Developing Lease,
Commencing
Year 8
Cost of
Development

1-5

End Value of Plant

40

BLAST
FURNACES
COPY HOLD
LAND

9,000p.a.
15,000

Value at
End of
Year 7

£

Discount
Rate

%

Present Value

£

96,165

95,051

7

5

59,056
(20,661)

5

15
5
5

£

38,395
11,550

198,000

7

123,294
(38,961)

84,333
2,130
232,573

Perpetuity
30

5,000

10

12,000

5

50,000
2,772
£285,345

Source: Craig, pp. 28, 29 and 35.

several of the pits currently in use were almost worked out new
mines needed to be opened up in order to maintain present levels of
production. The potential of the new pits was estimated from geological surveys and detailed information regarding conditions of
working the same seams of coal and ore by neighbouring concerns.
In Craig's judgment 11 the new pits could be expected to yield a
more valuable class of coal under easier mining conditions and,
therefore, prove more profitable than existing workings. 12 In estimating cash flows from present workings and new developments,
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Craig uses average prices ruling during the twelve months immediately prior to the date of the valuation exercise, but he does consider the implications of the following expected future developments
in the price of coal and wages rates paid to colliers.
1. The price of coal had been comparatively low for twelve years
but during the last six months there had been some improvement and Craig was of the opinion that the higher current
prices would be maintained in the future.13 A repetition of
the overproduction of coal which occurred in the 1870s was
considered improbable as, from that bitter experience, mine
owners had learned that such a situation was disastrous for
the supplier. 14
2. Owing to the passage of the Mines Regulations Act of 1887,
which restricted the employment of inexperienced and therefore lower paid colliers, an increase in business operating
costs was forecast.15 However, Craig argued that any resulting rise in wage rates would be substantially offset by the
lower cost of working the new pits.
Overall, the only significant departure, from the pattern of costs
and revenues used for valuation purposes, which Craig considered
likely to occur, was the possibility that future coal prices would
be higher than the previous year's average prices; i.e. a conservative valuation was implied.
Cash Flows: Blast Furnaces. It is when we turn to the valuation
of the blast furnaces that it becomes more difficult to reconcile
Craig's calculations with available factual evidence.16 During the
period 1885-89 an aggregate loss of £28,786 arose from operating
the blast furnaces, but during the six years prior to 1885 trading
results had been more favourable and he uses the overall returns
for the period 1879-89 to produce an average annual profit of
£2,858. Still not satisfied, Craig points out that iron prices had been
low for a number of years but were, in his opinion, now showing
signs of improvement. This, he feels, justifies using an average
annual revenue of £5,000 for capitalisation purposes. One reason
for averaging returns over a number of years, as a basis for future
projections, might be to avoid distortions which would be caused
by the existence of cyclical fluctuations in trading activity. No
suggestion was made in the report that this was the intention. Indeed it is perhaps more instructive, to note the inconsistency between the blast furnace valuation, based on average results over
a ten-year period, and the valuation of coal, based on profits earned
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during the previous twelve months thus ignoring the less favourable results arising previously from coal.
Discount Rates. It is probably in the choice of discount rates that
Craig's analysis is weakest in theory compared with present day
DCF criteria. It is generally accepted that the rate used should be a
function of the perceived risk attaching to the cash flows from the
investment, and that the assessment of that risk and the calculation
of the risk premium must be a subjective exercise based primarily
on the valuer's judgment. The discount rate in DCF calculations
represents an estimate of the opportunity cost of employing funds
in an investment of a particular risk class. It would therefore seem
appropriate, when valuing a business concern, to consider one rate
as applicable to the enterprise as a whole, given its overall risk
class. Table 1 shows that Craig selects different rates not only for
separate departments but also (1) for cash outlays and inflows relating to a single project, and (2) for different time periods within the
same stream of cash inflows. This means that Craig has a range
of discount rates, each adjusted according to the risk and uncertainty which he perceives for each stream of cash flows and for
each time period. In all he makes use of four different rates, 5%
for cash outlays, 15% for revenue from the collieries, further discounted at 7% where there is a seven year delay before revenue
begins to emerge, and 10% for revenue from the blast furnaces.
Each of these rates includes a premium over what may be considered the risk-free rate of interest in July 1889. For instance, the
bank rate at that date was 2½%,17 although it did fluctuate between
2½% and 6% during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It
is likely that, in fixing the risk premiums, Craig had in mind the
returns achieved by similar concerns in the locality with which he
was closely acquainted.
Once again it is the blast furnaces which receive the most
favourable treatment. Despite his already optimistic assessment
regarding the revenues likely to arise from that source, Craig introduces further upward bias by applying a discount rate of 10%,
compared with 15% for coal reserves.
Values Employed
In the event, Craig's valuations were not used as the direct basis
for fixing the price paid to Earl Granville, the sole proprietor of SCI.
The prospectus published to advertise an issue of preference
shares and debentures by the acquiring company (SISC), at the
time of its incorporation, includes reference to Craig's valuation of
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Granville's "properties at £285,345 exclusive of stocks of coal and
ironstone and stores," 18 but this is cited presumably only as evidence of the conservative nature of the figures actually used.
Separate agreements attached to SISC's memorandum of association, dated December 1889, show that the sale of SCI was "carried
out upon the basis of the balance sheet of the said business at the
30th day of June 1889"19 and that the sale of SIS was "carried out
upon the basis of the balance sheet of the said business at the 3rd
day of August 1889."20 Balance sheets of the vendor companies appear not to have survived, but the figures at which the assets were
initially accounted for by SISC are clearly set out in the unpublished
balance sheet of that concern dated 31 December 1889, and this
document includes £257,119 for the properties belonging to SCI.21
Although one may have major reservations concerning the economic significance of the asset values which were used for the
purpose of fixing prices payable to the vendors, it must be remembered that the method of business combination being discussed is
in the nature of a "pooling of interests" rather than an acquisition.
It is true that external sources of finance amounting to £250,000
(£100,000 debentures and £150,000 preference shares) were raised
at the time SISC was formed, of which £220,00022 was paid out to
Granville and the shareholders of SIS whose proprietary interests
were correspondingly reduced.23 Nevertheless, the entire equity
interest in SISC continued in the hands of individuals who had
been proprietors of the merged concerns. This, together with the
fact that there was no major disparity between the size and scale
of operations of the merged concerns, would cause the event to be
accounted for in some countries today, though not in Great Britain,24
on the "pooling" basis. It is also true that, at SISC, one accounting
characteristic of pooling was absent, namely the carrying forward
of the retained earnings of the amalgamating companies as the
retained earnings of the resulting entity; however, the other characteristic was clearly present, viz. the carrying forward of the book
values of assets belonging to the amalgamating companies to the
new concern. Consequently it would seem that we have an early,
albeit partial, example of pooling based on the idea that the accounting value of assets is not affected by the legal formality of
transferring them to a "new" owner where there is no real change
in the proprietary interest. This is not to suggest that those responsible for merging the activities of SCI and SIS were consciously
pioneering any radical development in accounting theory and practice. Indeed, the main virtue of the treatment adopted may have
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been its easy application and firms elsewhere may well have been
doing much the same.25
The effect of using the figures in SCI's balance sheet, at 30 June
1889, was to value the company at the historical costs incurred in
acquiring and developing properties prior to that date. The question arises: why did the contracting parties choose not to use
Craig's valuation for price-fixing purposes? In the absence of available evidence, we can only speculate on their possible motives.
Craig's calculations were based on two series of cash flows, namely
amounts expected to accrue from property presently being worked
and amounts expected to accrue from the development of leases
to be taken over by SISC. Although it is perfectly legitimate to incorporate both series in the valuation exercise, particularly as the
leaseholder was obliged to undertake development expenditure
under the terms of the leases, it does not follow that the purchaser
will be willing to pay the figure which results. In view of the considerable uncertainty attaching to cash flows based on development expenditure yet to be undertaken, the purchaser might well
argue for a lower figure, possibly based on present production
potential. Table I shows a total value of £232,573 for the collieries,
and this includes £96,165 attributable to present workings. One attractive feature of the collieries' figure of £189,611,26 appearing
in the balance sheet of SCI, could have been that it fell at a convenient point between those two valuations.
The figure of £50,000 described as "plant, machinery, furniture,
goodwill etc." in the agreement between SCI and SISC, is interesting. This item covers the six blast furnaces owned by Granville's
concern, a fact which might help to explain Craig's determination
to place a similar valuation on the furnaces despite a five-year
history of continuous loss making. An alternative explanation for
the coincidence of figures is that, as the agreement between SCI
and SISC was signed towards the end of 1889, the £50,000 valuation was written into the balance sheet of the former concern after
Craig had made his report, dated 16 July 1889.
The book values on which the prices paid to the vendors were
based, and which appear in the 31 December 1889 balance sheet
of SISC, were soon abandoned. It is not surprising that management should have wished to make some adjustment to the heterogeneous selection of figures transferred from SCI and SIS. For instance, there is evidence which shows that many of the figures
attached to assets taken over from SIS represented expenditure
incurred, at various stages during the previous twenty-five years,
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to which no adjustment had been made subsequent to the date of
acquisition. 27 A revaluation of the assets taken over was reported
to the company's auditors in a letter dated 19th January 1891.28 This
exercise resulted in a significant reallocation of book values between asset accounts and produced a shortfall of £30,000 which
was debited to goodwill. 29
An Ex Post View of Craig's

Valuation

The difficult problems inherent in achieving a precise assessment
of present value, namely accurately forecasting future cash flows
and identifying the right discount rate, are well understood. This
being so, it might seem churlish to concern ourselves overmuch
with an examination of the actual results achieved by SISC in the
years immediately following incorporation, particularly in view of
the early stage at which these fairly sophisticated calculations were
being attempted. Nevertheless, post fact evaluation of earlier business decisions is an important, if sometimes neglected, aspect of
management's learning process, and this is sufficient justification
for considering forecasts in the light of actual results.
There are practical difficulties which prevent us from carrying
out a detailed comparison, at the company level, of forecast results
with actual results achieved. First, SISC was formed to carry on the
combined activities of two existing companies and, although the
management accounting system of SISC calculated the profit or loss
for each department,30 a further analysis of results between the
assets of each of SISC's forerunners was probably considered irrelevant and was not made. A second difficulty arises because "the
system of arriving at interdepartmental costs was altered from
January 1st, 1891, the basis of charging at market price being
changed for that of charging at cost price." 31 This change in the
company's system of pricing transfers between departments was
made at the instigation of the company's auditors, Deloitte, Dever,
Griffiths & Co.,32 who had expressed concern with a method of
account keeping which made it impossible to establish the actual
cost of stock when preparing the annual balance sheet.b
b
Strict application of the realisation concept might be desirable for the purpose
of external reporting but its use within the management information system may
be more difficult to justify. The result of the change made at SISC was that transfers of materials between the collieries, blast furnaces, and iron and steel making
departments were made at cost, instead of market price which had been used previously. The effect was that, henceforth, internal accounting reports contained less
useful measures of the absolute and relative profitability of each department, e.g.
assuming the market price of surplus coal sold to outsiders exceeded cost, the re-
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Despite these obstacles certain ex post observations can be
made relevant to Craig's valuation. For the sixteen years following
incorporation, SISC did little better than breakeven, and it was only
the favourable conditions for iron and steelmaking created by the
First World War which saw SISC enjoy a period of sustained prosperity.33 During the two-and-a-half years following incorporation the
reported results were poor and prospects were sufficiently unfavourable to cause one of the company's shareholders to criticise
the amount paid to the vendors.34 Moreover, the company's chairman, when addressing the sixth annual general meeting, admitted
that the period since incorporation had been one of depression
following earlier prosperity,35 and the point has been made elsewhere36 that the reported results of SISC, prior to 1910, would have
been even worse but for the failure to make regular charges to
reflect the depreciation of fixed assets.
In order to obtain a clearer idea of whether the poor results
achieved following incorporation should have been foreseen, we
must re-examine Craig's valuations in the light of subsequent events.
Collieries. In 1891 Emmerson Bainbridge of Sheffield was asked
by the Board37 to inspect the mining properties and advise on their
"present condition and prospects." 38 His report, dated 2 November
1891, begins by drawing attention to the fact that "the company
was formed just at a time when the temporary inflation of the Coal
and Iron trade was at the best." 39 An important assumption on which
Craig's projections were based was proven wrong by subsequent
events. He expected the recent recovery in coal prices to continue,
whereas for six years during the 1890s the average price of coal
was significantly below that ruling in 1889.40 It is likely that this
forecasting error was partly offset by two factors—(1) wage rates,
which were tied to the price of coal by the sliding scale,41 also
fell 42 and (2) over the full forecasting period coal prices were higher
than had previously been the case.43 Regarding the price paid for
the collieries, Bainbridge makes the following critical observations:
I may add at this point (although it may not be within the
province of my Report) that considering the outlay upon
new works which has for sometime been understood to be
necessary, and the stipulation of the leases, and the need
for opening out new Coalfields, the value placed upon
suits of the collieries were understated and those of the iron and steel making departments overstated, judged by comparison with today's generally accepted accounting procedures for measuring profit.
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these Collieries at the time the Company acquired them
was in my opinion very much beyond their actual worth. 44
We have seen that the figure for the collieries, appearing in the
balance sheet used as the basis for fixing the price paid to the
vendor, was £189,611.45 This is well below Craig's valuation of
£232,573, which incorporates the expected financial effects of future
developments under the lease. Indeed, the value Craig placed on
present workings, £95,165, was probably much nearer what Bainbridge would have considered an appropriate price.
Blast Furnaces. Doubt has already been cast on whether the
£50,000 valuation placed on the blast furnaces was the result of an
entirely objective estimation process. For the four years prior to
the date of Craig's report, losses had been running at an average
annual level of £7,196. Craig's optimistic assumption that prices
would rise sufficiently to convert this loss into an annual profit
of £5,000 proved unjustified as it was a further ten years before
iron prices began to improve.46 This is not something which is clear
only with the benefit of hindsight. Following Bessemer's discoveries
in the 1860s there had been a rapid substitution in demand of steel
for iron and, as early as 1863, the ironmaster William Crawshay had
remarked that "the star of the iron trade was setting fast." 47 In
mitigation of Craig's assessment, it must be said that Jeremiah
Head, who was asked to investigate and report on the various departments in 1892, gave no indication either that the iron making
potential was in poor condition 48 or that it was overvalued.49 Also,
the managers at SISC must have considered it undervalued at
£50,000 for, when the purchase consideration was reallocated, a
figure of £60,250 was included for the blast furnaces.50
Summary and Conclusion
The inconsistency of using a single year's results as a basis for
projections in the case of the collieries, while for the blast furnaces
a ten-year average was calculated, has been pointed out. The use
of a number of different interest rates depending on the nature
and duration of estimated cash flows has also been criticised.
Apart from these two weaknesses, we consider the mechanics of
Craig's valuation exercise to be satisfactory. The underlying assumptions on which the calculations were based, however, turned
out to be wrong. The rise in the price of coal in the first half of
1889 was a temporary phenomenon and not part of the continuous
trend which Craig assumed. In addition, iron prices remained de-
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pressed throughout the 1890s, instead of rising sufficiently to convert losses into profits as Craig had hoped. Some doubt has also
been cast on the relevance, for price-fixing purposes, of a valuation
based on income projections, a major portion of which may arise
only if additional capital is raised and future investment decisions
are undertaken. As it turned out, the only use made of Craig's
estimate of present value was to demonstrate, to new investors
brought in at the time SISC was incorporated, the conservative
nature of the basis actually used.
One possible explanation for the contracting parties' ultimate
decision to use balance sheet values for price-fixing purposes is
that, unlike Craig's figures, they take no explicit account of the
potential value accruing to new work. However, balance sheet
values based on the accounting concept of historical cost are today
regarded as an unsound basis for resource allocation decisions.
This may not have been the case in 1889, though it is more likely
that the combined balance sheet values of SIS and SCI happened
to approximate "real" values, and it was considered convenient to
use them pending a revaluation of the entire concern. An alternative
explanation, put forward for the decision to employ balance sheet
values, is that the strong element of continuity of ownership justified
the use of a modified version of the pooling of interests basis of
accounting for mergers.
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